Multiple-Photon Absorption Attack on Entanglement-Based Quantum Key
  Distribution Protocols by Adenier, Guillaume et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
10
2.
33
66
v1
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  1
6 F
eb
 20
11
Multiple-Photon Absorption Attack on Entanglement-Based
Quantum Key Distribution protocols
Guillaume Adenier,∗ Masanori Ohya, and Noboru Watanabe
Tokyo University of Science, 2641 Yamazaki, Noda, Chiba 278-8510, Japan
Irina Basieva and Andrei Yu. Khrennikov
Linnaeus University, Vejdes plats 7, SE-351 95 Va¨xjo¨, Sweden
In elaborating on the multiple-photon absorption attack on Ekert protocol proposed in
arXiv:1011.4740, we show that it can be used in other entanglement-based protocols, in partic-
ular the BBM92 protocol. In this attack, the eavesdropper (Eve) is assumed to be in control of
the source, and she sends pulses correlated in polarization (but not entangled) containing several
photons at frequencies for which only multiple-photon absorptions are possible in Alice’s and Bob’s
detectors. Whenever the photons stemming from one pulse are dispatched in such a way that the
number of photons is insufficient to trigger a multiple-photon absorption in either channel, the pulse
remains undetected. We show that this simple feature is enough to reproduce the type of statis-
tics on the detected pulses that are considered as indicating a secure quantum key distribution,
even though the source is actually a mixture of separable states. The violation of Bell inequalities
measured by Alice and Bob increases with the order of the multiple-photon absorption that Eve
can drive into their detectors, while the measured quantum bit error rate decreases as a function
of the same variable. We show that the attack can be successful even in the simplest case of a
two-photon absorption or three-photon absorption attack, and we discuss possible countermeasures,
in particular the use of a fair sampling test.
INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution [1] aims at preventing an
eavesdropper (Eve) to acquire any information on a key
distributed to two parties (Alice and Bob) who wish to
use it to securely encrypt their communication through
a public channel. In the ideal case, the secrecy of the
key relies on two powerful theorems that are at the heart
of Quantum Mechanics: the no-cloning theorem, which
prevents an eavesdropper to clone an unknown quantum
state, and Bell’s theorem [2], which guarantees that no
local information actually exists which an eavesdropper
could acquire. In actual implementations of the proto-
cols, the imperfections of the components used to gen-
erate the key can be exploited by Eve to extract some
information about it [3].
Here, we elaborate on the multiple-photon absorption
attack on Ekert protocol [4] proposed by Adenier et al
[5], and show that the attack can also be successful
against other entanglement-based quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD) protocols, in particular the BBM92 protocol
[6]. We will detail the performances of the attack against
both Ekert and BBM92 protocols, as well as the possible
countermeasures available to Alice and Bob.
In both Ekert and BBM92 protocols, Alice and Bob
are randomly performing measurements on a small set of
bases (see Fig. 1). The idea it to generate a shared key by
exploiting the perfect correlation of entangled states [7]
whenever the measurements are performed in the same
basis. In the BBM92 protocol [6] the secrecy of the key
is guaranteed by a low enough quantum bit error rate
(QBER). In the Ekert protocol, it is guaranteed in ad-
Alice Bob
FIG. 1. Entanglement-based Quantum Cryptography. Al-
ice and Bob randomly switch their measurement settings. In
Ekert protocol, three settings are used on each sides. θA =
{0, pi
4
, pi
8
} for Alice, and θB = {0,−pi8 , pi8 } for Bob. Detections
associated with identical measurement settings (θA = θB) are
used to produce a correlated key, while those associated to
non-identical measurement settings (θA 6= θB) are used to
check the violation of Bell inequality (and the security of the
key). In the BBM92 protocol, Alice and Bob use two diagonal
bases only: θA = {0, pi4 } for Alice, and θB = {0, pi4 } for Bob
as well. The detections associated with identical measure-
ment settings (θA = θB) are used to produce the key, while
its security is guaranteed by a low enough QBER.
dition by a sufficiently large violation of Bell inequalities
[2, 8, 16–18] measured for non-identical measurements,
which allows in principle for device-independent quan-
tum key distribution (DIQKD) [19, 20].
We consider an entanglement-based QKD in which the
source is operated midway between Alice and Bob (see
Fig. 1). This type of configuration allows for higher losses
in optical fibers [21, 22], or for truly large distances in free
space with a source located onboard an orbiting satellite
[23, 24]. The source should therefore be considered to be
in a location untrusted by Alice and Bob, and we will
2in fact assume throughout this paper that Eve is in full
control of it.
MULTIPLE-PHOTON ABSORPTION ATTACK
Eve’s multiple-photon absorption attack [5] consists of
replacing the source of entangled photons altogether by
a controlled source of separable states (see Fig. 2). Eve’s
purpose is to let Alice and Bob convince themselves that
the secrecy of the key that they extract with this source
is guaranteed by the laws of Quantum Mechanics, while
in fact Eve has a full knowledge of the local states sent
to them both, and a fairly good knowledge of the key
that they generate with this source. As we will see, it
does not matter which of the Ekert or BBM92 protocols
is implemented by Alice and Bob. The attack works in
all cases by mimicking the statistics of an entangled state
well enough to pass the security checks normally under-
taken by Alice and Bob: it exhibits a high violation of
Bell inequalities and a low QBER.
The attack works as follows; Eve sends pulses contain-
ing photons that can each be represented by a local po-
larization state |λ〉, and she sets their frequency such that
the only way to get a click in a detector is when all the
photons from a pulse are absorbed in one same detector,
through a multiple-photon absorption [25]. To simplify
the discussion and highlight the principle of the attack,
we assume that Eve can control precisely the number of
photons in each pulse, their polarization and their fre-
quency. Eve sends n-photon pulses to Alice, the photons
having a frequency νn such that only an n-photon ab-
sorption is possible in Alice’s detectors, and she sends
m-photon pulses to Bob, the photons having a frequency
νm such that only an m-photon absorption is possible in
Bob’s detectors. As we will see, this simple attack is suf-
ficient to get a high enough violation of Bell inequalities
and a low enough QBER as soon as n > 1 or m > 1.
Single-photon absorption attack
In this first attempt, Eve is trying to approach as best
as she can the predictions of Quantum Mechanics for a
singlet state, but using only a mixture of separable states,
in a single-photon absorption scenario. She is therefore
sending pulses such that n = m = 1, at a frequency
ν1 where the dominant absorption is a standard single-
photon absorption (see Fig. 3-a). She will not succeed in
getting a violation of Bell inequalities or a low QBER, but
this result will serve as a basis to obtain a significantly
better result in the case of multiple-photon absorption.
Eve prepares a set of pairs of pulses for Alice and Bob.
Each pulse contains exactly one photon that is linearly
polarized in a direction λi chosen by Eve. It can thus be
described in its own Hilbert subspace Hi by a two-level
Alice Bob
Eve
FIG. 2. Principle of the Multiple-photon absorption attack.
Eve sends n-photon pulses to Alice, the photons having a fre-
quency νn and a polarization |λ〉; and m-photon pulses to
Bob, the photons having a frequency νm and a polarization
|λ + pi
2
〉. Eve chooses the frequency νn such that only an
n-photon absorption is possible in Alice’s detectors, and νm
such that only an m-photon absorption is possible in Bob’s
detectors. In the figure, Eve sends 2-photon pulses to Al-
ice, at a frequency such that a click can occur in A0 and
A1 only through a two-photon absorption, and she sends 3-
photon pulses to Bob, at a frequency such that a click can
occur in B0 and B1 only through a three-photon absorption.
a)
Single-photon
absorption b)
Two-photon
absorption
virtual
state
FIG. 3. Absorption of photons in the detectors: a) Single-
photon absorption. b) Two-photon absorption
state of the form
|λi〉 = cosλi|0〉+ sinλi|1〉, (1)
where |0〉 and |1〉 are the eigenvectors of σˆz with eigen-
values −1 and +1 respectively. The pair of pulses can
then be described in the tensor product Hilbert space
H12 = H1 ⊗H2 as |Λ12〉 = |λ1〉 ⊗ |λ2〉.
Alice and Bob, who are performing local measurements
respectively in H1 and H2, want to measure the statis-
tical correlation of the pairs they receive from Eve when
they perform some rotations Rˆ(θA) and Rˆ(θB) on their
respective pulses, followed by a measurement of the ob-
servable σˆz.
Since Eve wants them to obtain an as good
(anti)correlation as possible with separable states, she
sends orthogonal states to Alice and Bob, that is, such
that λ1 = λ and λ2 = λ+
pi
2 , and the initial state sent to
Alice and Bob can be written:
|Λ12〉 = |λ〉 ⊗ |λ+ pi
2
〉 (2)
3For a pair initially represented by this state (2), the state
after local rotations on each sides becomes
|ΛAB〉 = |λ+ θA〉 ⊗ |λ+ pi
2
+ θB〉, (3)
which can be expanded as
|ΛAB〉 = cos(λ+ θA) cos(λ+ pi
2
+ θB)|00〉
+sin(λ+ θA) cos(λ+
pi
2
+ θB)|10〉
+cos(λ+ θA) sin(λ+
pi
2
+ θB)|01〉
+sin(λ+ θA) sin(λ+
pi
2
+ θB)|11〉,
(4)
Keeping the condition of orthogonality between Alice
and Bob from pair to pair, Eve is randomizing the pa-
rameter λ associated to each pair. The state of the set
of pairs prepared by Eve can therefore be described by
a mixture. We can characterize the probability of ob-
taining a state between |λ〉 and |λ+ dλ〉 by a probability
density distribution ρ(λ) on a single probability space
(Ω,F , P ).
The mixture ρˆ describing the set of pairs after rotation
is therefore
ρˆAB =
∫
Ω
ρ(λ)dλ |ΛAB〉〈ΛAB|, (5)
with
∫
Ω ρ(λ)dλ = 1.
Note that we chose to denote the polarization of the
pulses prepared by Eve as λ, a symbol that is tradition-
ally reserved to hidden-variables, but this variable is in
fact hidden only from Alice and Bob, and it is not a hypo-
thetical supplementary parameters to Quantum Theory.
By describing the state with mixtures, we adopt here the
point of view of Alice and Bob. However, the parameter
λ describing the state of each pulse is freely chosen by
Eve. Thus it can in principle even be deterministic, as a
function of time. Eve needs only to make sure that there
is on average no preferred direction for the λ so that the
source is rotationally invariant for Alice and Bob, both
at the single-count and coincidence-count level.
After performing their respective rotation on the re-
ceived pulses, Alice and Bob perform a joint measure-
ment σz⊗ σz on each pair. The expectation value of this
measurement is:
EAB = 〈σˆz ⊗ σˆz〉ρˆAB = Tr(ρˆABσˆz ⊗ σˆz), (6)
with σˆz = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|, so that
σˆz ⊗ σˆz = |00〉〈00| − |10〉〈10| − |01〉〈01|+ |11〉〈11|,
and where Tr is the trace, defined as the sum of the di-
agonal matrix elements in any orthonormal basis, which
in our case is Tr Oˆ =
∑1
i,j=0〈ij|Oˆ|ij〉, where Oˆ is an
operator in H12.
By linearity of the trace, we can write
EAB = P00 − P10 − P01 + P11,
with
Pkl = Tr(ρˆAB|kl〉〈kl|),
where k and l are 0 or 1.
The Pkl are the joint probabilities, and we can now
express them explicitly, using Eq. (5), as
Pkl =
1∑
i,j=0
∫
Ω
ρ(λ)dλ 〈ij|ΛAB〉〈ΛAB|kl〉〈kl|ij〉,
which, since {|00〉, |10〉, |01〉, |11〉} forms an orthonormal
basis in H12, simplifies as
Pkl =
∫
Ω
ρ(λ)dλ
∣∣〈kl|ΛAB〉∣∣2. (7)
Note that, owing to the separability of |ΛAB〉 as ex-
pressed by Eq. (3), we can factorize the integrand in the
above joint probability into a product, that is,
Pkl =
∫
Ω
ρ(λ)dλ
∣∣〈k|λ+ θA〉〈l|λ+ pi
2
+ θB〉
∣∣2. (8)
Denoting the probability to get a photon in a channel
i for a local state |λ〉 and a measurement direction θ as
Pi(λ, θ) =
∣∣〈i|λ+ θ〉∣∣2, (9)
which is explicitly
P0(λ, θ) = cos
2(λ+ θ),
P1(λ, θ) = sin
2(λ+ θ),
(10)
we can rewrite Eq. (8) as
Pkl =
∫
Ω
ρ(λ)dλ Pk(λ, θA) Pl(λ+
pi
2
, θB), (11)
which can be simply interpreted as the integral on all
possible λ of the product of the probability to detect a
photon in channel k on Alice’s side for a local state |λ〉
by the probability to get a photon in channel l on Bob’s
side for a local state |λ+ pi2 〉.
Assuming ρ(λ) is a uniform distribution on the interval
[0, 2pi[, we can then express these integrals explicitly as
P00 =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dλ cos2(λ+ θA) cos
2(λ+
pi
2
+ θB),
P10 =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dλ sin2(λ + θA) cos
2(λ+
pi
2
+ θB),
P01 =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dλ cos2(λ+ θA) sin
2(λ+
pi
2
+ θB),
P11 =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dλ sin2(λ + θA) sin
2(λ+
pi
2
+ θB),
(12)
4which leads to
P00 = P11 =
1
8
(2− cos 2(θA − θB)),
P10 = P01 =
1
8
(2 + cos 2(θA − θB)),
(13)
and finally, we get
EAB = −1
2
cos 2(θA − θB). (14)
This result differs essentially from the prediction for
the singlet state by its visibility of 1/2 instead of 1. With
this correlation function, the maximum of the CHSH
function [8], defined as
S = |E(θA, θB)+E(θ′A, θB)+E(θA, θ′B)−E(θ′A, θ′B)| (15)
is S =
√
2, which is clearly below 2 and therefore insuf-
ficient as an attack on Ekert protocol.
Similarly, this attack fails against the BBM92 protocol.
The QBER can be estimated [9, 10] from the visibility V
as QBER = 1−V2 . With V = 1/2, the QBER measured
by Alice and Bob is as high as 25% in this single-photon
attack, which Alice and Bob would not fail to reject.
Two-photon absorption attack
In the two-photon absorption attack, Eve similarly
sends pairs of pulses described by a mixture of separa-
ble states (5) to Alice and Bob, but this time each pulse
contains two photons instead of one. The photons inside
a pulse share the same state: |λ〉 for the two photons
inside the pulse sent to Alice; and |λ + pi2 〉 for the two
photons inside the pulse sent to Bob. We assume that
the photons inside a pulse are independent: each photon
follows the rules of Quantum Mechanics as prescribed by
its quantum state independently of what the other pho-
tons inside the pulse are doing.
Now, the crucial difference is that these photons are
chosen by Eve with a frequency ν2 lower than in the
single-photon absorption case discussed above, so that
the energy of a single photon is insufficient to trigger a
click. Eve chooses the frequency of the photons such that
the only way to get a click is through a two-photon ab-
sorption (see Fig. 3-b). We assume for simplicity that
whenever two photons hit the same detector simultane-
ously, the probability that they trigger a click in the de-
tector is 1. As we will see, this feature alone is (surpris-
ingly) enough to lead to a clear violation of Bell inequal-
ities and a low QBER.
So, a click occurs in a specific output channel of a po-
larizing beam-splitter (PBS) only when the two photons
inside the same pulse choose to exit through that same
channel. If they choose different channels, no two-photon
absorption can occur because there is only one photon in
each channel. On each side, the three possibilities are:
• Both photons go to channel 0 → click in channel 0
through a two-photon absorption,
• Both photons go to channel 1 → click in channel 1
through a two-photon absorption,
• One photon goes to channel 0, the other goes to
channel 1 → no click in either channel.
Note that this third possibility brings us in the realm
of the detection loophole [11–15]. It is the essential rea-
son for the appearance of the violation of Bell inequalities
that Alice and Bob are going to obtain. It should however
be stressed that the non detections come from the fre-
quency threshold in the photoelectric effect alone; a fea-
ture that is relevant in all detectors based on this effect,
regardless of their quantum efficiency. Eve is therefore
working in a fully Quantum Mechanical framework, with-
out assuming anything about the detectors other than
the existence of two-photon absorption processes at cer-
tain frequencies, and without assuming the existence of
any hidden-variables.
We want to calculate the probabilities P
(2)
kl that Alice
and Bob get a coincidence click respectively in channels
k and l in a two-photon absorption attack.
Note that whenever it is necessary to avoid possible
ambiguities, we will label hereafter the equations with
an upper script (n) or (n,m) indicating the order of the
multiple-photon attack. For instance the joint proba-
bility P
(2)
kl is for a two-photon absorption attack, while
P
(2,3)
kl is the same probability for a mixed attack in which
Alice is subjected to a two-photon attack while Bob is
subjected to a three-photon attack.
Assuming independence between the photons, for a lo-
cal state |λ〉 and a measurement angle θ on either side,
the probability that both photons from one pulse end up
in the same channel i is simply the square of the probabil-
ity Pi(λ, θ) to see one such photon exit the PBS through
this channel i, that is: P 2i (λ, θ)
So, similarly to what we had in the single photon case
in Eq.(11), the probability P
(2)
kl to get a click in channel
k for Alice and in channel l for Bob in a two-photon ab-
sorption process is therefore the integral over all possible
state of the product of the probability P 2k (λ, θA) for Alice
to get a click in channel k by the probability P 2l (λ+
pi
2 , θB)
for Bob to get a click in channel l:
P
(2)
kl =
∫
Ω
ρ(λ)dλ P 2k (λ, θA) P
2
l (λ+
pi
2
, θB). (16)
For a rotationally invariant source, λ is uniformly dis-
5tributed on the interval [0, 2pi[, which leads to:
P
(2)
00 =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dλ cos4(λ+ θA) cos
4(λ+
pi
2
+ θB),
P
(2)
10 =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dλ sin4(λ+ θA) cos
4(λ+
pi
2
+ θB),
P
(2)
01 =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dλ cos4(λ+ θA) sin
4(λ+
pi
2
+ θB),
P
(2)
11 =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dλ sin4(λ+ θA) sin
4(λ +
pi
2
+ θB),
(17)
and we obtain:
P
(2)
00 = P
(2)
11 =
1
128
(18− 16 cos 2(θA − θB) + cos 4(θA − θB),
P
(2)
01 = P
(2)
10 =
1
128
(18 + 16 cos 2(θA − θB) + cos 4(θA − θB).
(18)
Note that these four probabilities no longer add up
to 1, because of the cases involving a non detection on
either side or both, which are discarded by Alice and
Bob. So, as is standard in optical EPR experiment and in
entanglement-based QKD with photons, the correlation
function has to be normalized by the sum
∑
k,l P
(2)
kl :
E
(2)
AB =
P
(2)
00 − P (2)10 − P (2)01 + P (2)11
P
(2)
00 + P
(2)
10 + P
(2)
01 + P
(2)
11
. (19)
We obtain explicitly
E
(2)
AB = −
16 cos 2(θA − θB)
18 + cos 4(θA − θB) ,
which lead to a violation of Bell inequalities for θA =
{0, pi4 } and θB = {−pi8 , pi8 } of
S(2) =
16
18
2
√
2 ≈ 2.51,
which is clearly above 2.
Here the visibility is V = 0.842, so that a BBM92
protocol would give a QBER of 7.9%, which is already
well below the security bound of 11% against coherent
attacks [10, 21, 22].
Multiple-photon absorption attack
A similar demonstration in the case of a three-photon
absorption, with Eve sending three photons per pulse,
leads to
P
(3)
kl =
∫
Ω
ρ(λ)dλ P 3k (λ, θA) P
3
l (λ+
pi
2
, θB) (20)
which exhibits a violation of Bell inequalities as high as
S(3) ≈ 3.17, and a QBER of 2.1%. Quite generally, a
multi-photon absorption process can lead to a violation
of Bell inequalities as large as desired within the algebraic
limit of 4, the only limit being the order of the multiple-
photon absorptions that Eve can drive into Alice’s and
Bob’s detectors.
Note that if Eve sends pulses meant to drive on one side
a two-photon absorption and on the other a three-photon
absorption (a feature that Eve could achieve by alterna-
tively sending photons of different frequency to Alice and
Bob), the relevant probabilities for the coincidences are
of the form
P
(2,3)
kl =
∫
Ω
ρ(λ)dλ P 2k (λ, θA) P
3
l (λ+
pi
2
, θB) (21)
which leads to a correlation
E
(2,3)
AB = −
10 cos 2(θA − θB)
10 + cos 4(θA − θB)
and a violation of Bell inequalities for θA = {0, pi4 } and
θB = {−pi8 , pi8 } of exactly
S(2,3) = 2
√
2,
which is the maximum violation predicted by Quantum
Mechanics for entangled states.
In case of a BBM92 protocol, the QBER measured by
Alice and Bob is 4.5%. This is below the critical QBER of
7.1% for a device-independent quantum key distribution
(DIQKD) in which not only the source but also the mea-
surement devices used by Alice and Bob are untrusted
[19, 20]. The reason for this behavior is essentially that
the detection probability of the pulses is below the 83%
required to close the detection loophole [12, 26]. This
shows the absolute necessity of a loophole-free violation
of Bell inequalities in a DIQKD scenario [19, 20].
The performances of the various multiple-photon ab-
sorption attacks are summarized in Table I, and the cor-
responding correlation functions measured by Alice and
Bob are displayed in Fig. 5.
Multiple-photon absorption attack as an adaptive
process
In order to interpret and explain this seemingly un-
likely violation of Bell inequalities with a mixture of sep-
arable states, it is convenient to look locally (e.g. on
Alice’s side) at the probability that a pulse λ imping-
ing on a polarizing beam-splitter gets detected in either
output channel.
In the multiple-photon absorption attack, the only way
to get a click with a pulse containing n photon is through
an n-photon absorption, so that the probability to get a
click in an output channel i is equal to the probabil-
ity that all the photons from a pulse exit through this
same channel. Assuming the independence of the pho-
tons, this probability is simply the power n of the prob-
ability Pi(λ, θ) of Eq. (9) that a single photon polarized
6along λ goes to channel i. The probability to get a click
in either output channel for an incoming n-photon pulse
is therefore:
P
(n)
clic =
(
P0(λ, θ)
)n
+
(
P1(λ, θ)
)n
= cos2n(λ+ θ) + sin2n(λ + θ).
(22)
In the single-photon attack presented in the first sec-
tion (n = 1), each pulse polarized along λ contains one
photon only, and the probabilities to get a click in either
channel are adding up to one, that is, P
(1)
clic = 1, which
denotes that a photon impinging on a PBS is necessar-
ily detected in one of the output channels in the ideal
case. All the single-photon pulses are therefore treated
on equal footing, independently of the state λ and of the
measurement setting θ, and this is why this attack fails
to lead to an observed violation of Bell inequalities.
By contrast, in the case of a two-photon absorption
attack, the probability that a pulse containing n photons
polarized along λ gets detected in either channel becomes
P
(2)
clic = cos
4(λ+ θ) + sin4(λ+ θ)
=
1
4
(3 + cos(4(λ+ θ)).
(23)
It exhibits a clear dependence on the state of the pulse
λ and the local measurement setting θ. It means that
the interaction of each pulse λ with the measurement ap-
paratus as a whole (constituted by the polarizing beam-
splitter and the detectors) depends on the very setting θ
of this apparatus: the detection process in the multiple-
photon absorption attack is state-adaptive [27]. This
behavior is illustrated in Fig. 4. In the two-photon
and three-photon absorption attacks, the response of the
measurement apparatus to incoming pulses is radically
different when the measurement setting is θ = 0 than
when it is θ = pi4 . This behavior is hidden from Alice and
Bob by the randomness of λ from one pair to the other,
but the consequence is that different parts of the prob-
ability space are in effect weighted as a function of the
local context θ. It leads to a bi-local dependence on the
contexts (θA, θB) when calculating the probabilities asso-
ciated with the coincidences, and this feature is known
to open the possibility of a violation of Bell inequalities
with local states [18, 27, 28].
Eve’s knowledge of the key
In a multiple-photon absorption attack, Eve has a full
knowledge of the local states that she sends to Alice and
Bob. Each pair is characterized by state of the form
Eq.(2), where the polarization λ characterizing each pair
is chosen by Eve. This perfect knowledge of the local
state sent to Alice and Bob does not however mean that
Eve has a perfect knowledge of the key that they will
a)
-
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FIG. 4. Probability of detection of a pulse λ in either output
channel: a) for θ = 0, b) for θ = pi/4. In the single-photon
case, the probability to detect a pulse is identically equal to
1/2, which denotes a passive response of the measurement ap-
paratus: all single-photon pulses are treated on equal ground.
By contrast, in the two-photon and three-photon absorption
attacks the process is adaptive in the sense that the proba-
bility that a pulse λ gets detected in either channel depends
strongly on the measurement context θ encountered.
generate with these pairs, because of the inherent proba-
bilistic nature of Quantum predictions whenever one per-
forms a measurement in another basis than the one in
which a state was prepared.
The key is generated in those cases in which Alice
and Bob are performing identical measurement, that is
θA = θB = θ. Knowing α = |λ + θ| for each pulse, Eve
knows the probabilities for 0 and 1 to be realized on each
side, and she simply bets for the one that has the higher
probability.
Consider the cases for which 0 < |λ + θ| < pi/4. We
then have cos2(λ + θ) > sin2(λ + θ), so that P0(λ, θ) >
P1(λ, θ) for Alice and P1(λ+pi/2, θ) > P0(λ+pi/2, θ) for
Bob. Eve therefore bets that the bit measured by Alice
is 0 and that the bit measured by Bob is 1.
Assuming independence between the photons, the
probability that all the photons from an n−photon pulse
on Alice’s side end up in channel 1, and thus generate a
click opposite to Eve’s guess, is Pn1 (λ, θ). Just the same,
the probability that all the photons from an m−photon
7pulse on Bob’s side end up in channel 0, and thus gen-
erate a click opposite to Eve’s guess, is Pm0 (λ + pi/2, θ).
The probability that Eve guesses incorrectly a bit shared
by Alice and Bob when 0 < |λ+ θ| < pi/4 is therefore
Pn1 (λ, θ)P
m
0 (λ+ pi/2, θ) = sin
2(n+m)(λ+ θ).
Similarly, in the cases for which pi/4 < |λ + θ| < pi/2,
the probability that Eve guesses incorrectly is
Pn0 (λ, θ)P
m
1 (λ + pi/2, θ) = cos
2(n+m)(λ+ θ).
The same reasoning can be extended to higher values of
|λ+θ|, leading either to a dependence on sin2(n+m)(λ+θ)
or cos2(n+m)(λ + θ), so that on average, for a uniform
distribution of λ on the circle, the probability that Eve
guesses incorrectly a bit shared by Alice and Bob is
P (n,m)error =
2
pi
( ∫ pi/4
0
dα sin2(n+m) α+
∫ pi/2
pi/4
dα cos2(n+m) α
)
.
Note that the pulses for which Eve has the least infor-
mation are those where cos2n(λ+ θ) ≈ sin2n(λ+ θ), that
is |λ + θ| ≈ pi/4 + kpi/2. It is also for these pulses that
Alice and Bob are the most likely to not end up with the
same bit, thus increasing the measured QBER. Unfortu-
nately for Alice and Bob, as soon as n > 1 or m > 1, it
is also for these pulses that the probability of detection
is the smallest for a fixed n and m, as given by Eq. (22).
Since this probability decreases for higher-order multiple-
photon absorption, it also means that, rather counter-
intuitively, the probability P
(n,m)
error that Eve makes a mis-
take guessing a bit shared by Alice and Bob decreases
with higher violation of Bell inequality and with lower
QBER (see Table I).
Alice and Bob should therefore be wary not to trust a
strong violation of Bell inequality and/or a low QBER as
such, because it might give them the wrong impression
that the strength of this violation and/or the small num-
ber of errors in the key make it safe when it is in fact the
opposite.
COUNTERMEASURES
Monitoring the single and coincidence counts
Detecting Eve’s attack by monitoring closely the single
counts and the coincidence counts is not a trivial task.
As we have seen, a violation of Bell inequalities or a
low QBER is not a trustworthy criterion unless the de-
tection efficiency is higher than the values given in Table
I. If Alice and Bob were taking into account the non-
detected pulses to compute the correlation, for instance
by assigning a random bit value to non-detected pulses
[19], they would not get any violation of Bell inequality
TABLE I. Performances of multiple-photon absorption at-
tacks. η is the minimum channel efficiency required to rule
out each attack; S is the violation of the CHSH inequality
measured by Alice and Bob; V is the visibility; QBER is the
quantum bit error rate; and P
(n,m)
error is the corresponding prob-
ability for Eve to incorrectly guess a bit shared by Alice and
Bob.
(n,m) η S V QBER P
(n,m)
error
(1,1) 100%
√
2 0.50 25% 5.67%
(2,2) 75% 2.51 0.84 7.9% 0.82%
(2,3) 68.75% 2
√
2 0.91 4.5% 0.17%
(3,3) 62.5% 3.17 0.96 2.1% 0.14%
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Θa-Θb
-1.0
-0.5
0.5
1.0
EAB
EAB
H1,1L
EAB
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H2,3L
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H3,3L
FIG. 5. Correlations measured by Alice and Bob depending
on the order of Eve’s multiple-photon absorption attack. An
important property of this attack is that the correlations mea-
sured by Alice and Bob are rotationally invariant: they only
depend on the difference between their measurement angles
θA and θB, and not on their absolute values. It means that
the attack is basis independent, and that it works indepen-
dently of which entanglement-based QKD protocol is chosen
by Alice and Bob.
with this attack. However, the typical detection efficien-
cies obtained in actual implementation of QKD protocols
with photons are far below the bounds given in Table I.
Eve’s attack is therefore relevant because discarding the
pairs for which no detection is recorded on either side and
normalizing by the sum of coincidences is the standard
way of dealing with non-detections. Alice and Bob would
therefore not be able to distinguish a genuine source of
entangled photons from this attack by simply observing
a violation of Bell inequalities.
8Monitoring the single counts is also unlikely to be-
tray Eve’s attack, because all the channels are treated
on equal footing by the attack, and the source is rota-
tionally invariant. The channel efficiencies are therefore
balanced: the marginals are random for each measure-
ment, as would be expected from a singlet state.
In the ideal case, the multiple-photon absorption at-
tack does not produce any double-counts either that
could be spotted by Alice and Bob, because a click occurs
only when all the photons from a pulse exit through the
same channel. In case of a two-photon absorption attack
for instance, the only way to get a double-count would
be with a pulse containing no less than 4 photons, which
is impossible once we assume that Eve controls the num-
ber of photons in each pulse. Even if, more realistically,
Eve had not a tight control on the number n of photons
inside a pulse, for instance if she was using a weak co-
herent source for which the distribution of the number
of photons is Poissonian P (n) = e−µ µ
n
n! , a double-count
would only be possible for pulses containing 4 photons
or more, which would have a much smaller probability to
occur than the probability to get a pulse with 2 photons,
for small enough values of µ.
Looking at the individual rates of coincidences is also
unlikely to betray Eve’s attack. The predicted rates of
coincidences and the correlations functions are all rota-
tionally invariant: they depend only on the angle differ-
ence |θB − θB|, as is the case for a genuine singlet state.
The attack is basis independent.
The correlation function differs slightly from the
−Vcos 2(θA − θB) expected for a singlet state in a lossy
channel, but this difference is small and in actuality it
would be difficult to distinguish the correlations obtained
with a multiple-photon absorption attack from the cor-
relation predicted for a genuine entangled state with a
reduced visibility, especially if only a few points of the
correlation are actually measured, as is the case in an
entanglement-based QKD protocol.
An unwanted feature that could betray Eve’s presence
is that the sum of coincidences depends on the measure-
ment settings θA and θB. The stronger the violation of
Bell inequalities, the stronger the visibility of the sum of
coincidences. For instance, its visibility is about 0.06 in
the two-photon absorption case (S(2) ≈ 2.51), and it is
0.10 in the mixed case with two-photon absorption on one
side and three-photon on the other side (S(2,3) = 2
√
2.).
However, Eve can remove this unwanted effect entirely
by driving different detection patterns for Alice and Bob,
in a similar way to what was done by Larsson [12] and
Gisin [13] in their hidden-variable models. The simplest
method would be to alternatively drive a single photon
absorption on one side, and a multiple-photon absorption
on the other side. The sampling is then always fair on the
side driven to a single photon absorption, and the total
number of coincidences becomes independent of the mea-
surement angles. It is nevertheless in Alice’s and Bob’s
interest to closely monitor the sum of coincidence for any
such angle dependence, because if it does not guaran-
tee in principle against this attack, it makes Eve’s task
more difficult by forcing her to use higher order multiple-
photon absorptions to achieve the same violation of Bell
inequalities or the same QBER.
Precluding multiple-photon absorption attacks
The assumption of fair sampling [14, 15, 29] that is
considered to be reasonable for experiments constraining
the possible models of Nature [16, 17] is made invalid
by the multiple-photon absorption attack: the sample
of detected pulses does not represent fairly the pulses
that are emitted. The fair sampling assumption becomes
equivalent in this case to the assumption that under the
conditions of use in an actual entanglement-based QKD,
the detectors are actually sensitive to the single-photons
received by Alice and Bob.
As reasonable as this assumption might be in the ideal
case, Alice and Bob would still need to be very careful
to ensure that the imperfections in the various measur-
ing devices are not compromising its validity in actual
implementations of QKD protocols.
Using frequency filters so that only a known range of
restricted frequencies can reach the detectors is an ob-
vious way to limit the possibility of multiple-photon ab-
sorption in the ideal case. However, in actual implemen-
tations of QKD protocols, Alice and Bob still need to
guarantee that the dominant way to get a click in their
necessarily imperfect detector is through a single-photon
absorption, even at those frequencies allowed by the fil-
ters.
The energy diagram displayed on figure 3 is that of
an ideal two-level system, so that the frequency at which
a two-photon absorption occurs is exactly half that of
a single-photon absorption. In a real detector however,
where the energy levels are bound to be more compli-
cated, photons with a frequency just slightly lower than
ν1 could trigger a two-photon absorption if there exist
other stable energy levels above |g〉.
This issue becomes far more critical considering the
existing faked-state attacks that have already been suc-
cessfully implemented against QKD protocols [30–32], by
forcing the detectors to exit the single-photon sensitive
Geiger mode [31]. It is conceivable that this type of blind-
ing attack could be tailored to allow only a multiple-
photon absorption in the detectors used by Alice and
Bob, at those precise frequencies that are permitted to go
through. Such a combination of blinding detector attack
together with our source designed for a multiple-photon
absorption attack could then constitute a robust attack
even against Ekert protocol, something that the blinding
attack alone could not do [30].
9Testing the fairness of the sample
An active method for Alice and Bob to detect Eve’s at-
tack, or to make sure that reducing the dark counts is not
made at the cost of increasingly biasing the detection of
signal pulses, would be to implement a fair sampling test
[33] adapted to quantum key distribution with entangled
states [34].
This fair sampling test does not introduce any loss and
can be performed locally and unilaterally on either side
during the production of the key. In a nutshell, it con-
sists of analyzing the output channels of the measuring
devices (here, the polarizing beam-splitters) instead of
simply feeding detectors with them. The standard design
of an entanglement-based QKD is kept intact, with two
polarizing beam-splitters on each side (Alice and Bob)
projecting the incoming pulses on random bases θA and
θB, as depicted on Fig. 1. The novelty is to replace each
detector by a polarimeter: a polarizing beam-splitter fol-
lowed by a detector at each output.
Consider Alice’s side (see Fig. 6). We label the po-
larimeter in channel 0 as A0, the orientation of its po-
larizing beam-splitter as ϕA0 , and the detectors in the
transmitted and reflected output as A+0 and A
−
0 respec-
tively. A click in either of these two detectors is treated
as a click in channel 0.
Similarly, the polarimeter in channel 1 is labeled A1,
the orientation of its polarizing beam-splitter ϕA1 , and
the detectors in the transmitted and reflected output are
A+1 and A
−
1 respectively. A click in either of these two
detectors is treated as a click in channel 1.
Bob would proceed similarly with two polarimeters la-
beled B0 and B1.
Let us denote P0,+ the probability that a photon ini-
tially polarized along λ ends up in the + channel of po-
larimeter A0, that is, channel A
+
0 . It is equal to the prob-
ability P0(λ, θA) that this photon exits in the 0 channel,
multiplied by the probability that this same photon, im-
pinging on polarimeter 0 with an output polarization θA,
exits through the output channel +:
P0,+ = cos
2(λ + θA) cos
2(θA − ϕA0). (24)
Similarly, we have
P0,− = cos
2(λ + θA) sin
2(θA − ϕA0). (25)
In the general case of a n-photon absorption, for a pulse
containing exactly n photons all polarized along λ, the
probability that a multiple-photon absorption occurs in
either channel of the polarimeter is equal to the proba-
bility to that all photons exit in the same output channel
A+0 plus the probability to that all photons exit in the
same output channel A−0 , that is, (P0,+)
n + (P0,−)
n. As
usual, we have assumed that the photons are indepen-
dent.
Alice
Source
FIG. 6. Fair Sampling test on Alice’s side. The detector in
channel 0 is replaced by a polarimeter A0 with two detectors
A+0 and A
−
0 . The detector in channel 1 is replaced by a po-
larimeter A1 with two detectors A
+
1 and A
−
1 . Ekert protocol
is thus unaltered by the fair sampling test: polarimeter A0
is equivalent to the detector in channel 0 in Fig. 1, and po-
larimeter A1 is equivalent to the detector in channel 1. Bob
would proceed similarly to test the fairness of the sampling
on his side.
To get the probability of a click in either channel of a
polarimeter for our uniformly distributed source of po-
larized pulses, we just need to average over all possible
λ:
P
(n)
0,FS =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dλ cos2n(λ+ θA)·
(
cos2n(θA − ϕA0) + sin2n(θA − ϕA0)
)
, (26)
and
P
(n)
1,FS =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
dλ sin2n(λ+ θA)·
(
cos2n(θA − ϕA1) + sin2n(θA − ϕA1)
)
, (27)
Naturally, in the case of a single-photon absorption,
for pulses containing exactly one photon, we get a prob-
ability of detection in each polarimeter that is identically
equal to 12 :
P
(1)
0,FS = P
(1)
1,FS =
1
2
. (28)
This illustrates the fact that in this single-photon absorp-
tion case the sampling is fair. This is also the result that
one would expect from a genuine source of entangled pho-
tons: a photon impinging on a polarizing beam-splitter
will be detected with probability 1 in either of the two
output channels.
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FIG. 7. Probability of a click in a polarimeter (0 or 1) in the
Fair Sampling test as a function of θA − ϕA. In the single-
photon case, the probability of click in a polarimeter is in-
dependent of the measurement settings: the sampling is fair.
As soon however as Eve uses two-photon absorption in order
to drive a violation of Bell inequalities in Alice’s and Bob’s
detectors, they can spot the resulting unfairness of the sam-
pling, due to the state-adaptivity of the attack, when θA−ϕA
is varied (which is done automatically if ϕA is fixed, and if θA
is varied randomly from pair to pair as is already the case in
an entanglement-based QKD protocol).
However, as soon as we consider a two-photon absorp-
tion case, we obtain
P
(2)
0,FS = P
(2)
1,FS =
3
32
(
3 + cos 4(θA − ϕA)
)
, (29)
and similarly in the three-photon absorption case, we get
P
(3)
0,FS = P
(3)
1,FS =
5
128
(
5 + 3 cos 4(θA − ϕA)
)
, (30)
where ϕA is either ϕA0 or ϕA1 .
The average probability to get a click in a polarimeter
(0 or 1) becomes clearly dependent on the measurement
setting θA and the polarimeter setting ϕA), which betrays
the state-adaptivity of the attack, and the resulting un-
fair sampling (see Fig.7).
Alice can perform this test locally, and unilaterally,
in order to spot the unfairness of the sampling due to
the state-adaptivity of Eve’s attack. She only needs to
compare the sum of single counts in the + and − output
channel of a polarimeter when θA−ϕA is varied. She can
do so by keeping the settings of her polarimeters fixed, for
instance at ϕA = ϕA0 = ϕA1 = 0, while θA is randomly
switched from pair to pair, as is already the case in both
Ekert and BBM92 protocol. Naturally, Bob can perform
the test unilaterally and locally as well.
Advantages of the Fair Sampling test against other
attacks
Note that the setup used for the Fair Sampling test
would also make the other attacks against QKD protocols
more complicated (if not impossible) to implement.
The faked-state attack [30–32] consists of Eve imper-
sonating Bob, intercepting the signal that is intended
for him and using the exact same procedure that Bob
would have implemented. In order to hide her presence,
Eve’s strategy consists of sending to Bob a signal that
will deterministically give him the exact same measure-
ment result as measured by Eve, but only in those cases
in which Eve and Bob turned out to be performing their
measurements in the same basis. In the remaining cases,
when their bases are diagonal to each others, Eve’s signal
must not trigger any detection in any of Bob’s detectors.
To implement this idea, Bob’s detectors are blinded
to single-photon detection by Eve. After each detection,
Eve sends a signal that produces a click in one of Bob’s
detectors only when it is fully reflected or fully trans-
mitted by its polarizing beamsplitter. So, whenever the
bases chosen at random by Eve and Bob are diagonal
with respect to each other, the signal sent by Eve is split
in half at Bob’s polarizing beamsplitter and is insufficient
to produce a click in either detector.
This attack would however be immediately visible with
our fair sampling test, because it would lead to double-
clicks in the polarimeters. Locally, in the cases where Eve
performs her measurement in the same basis θA as Bob,
everything would be fine when |ϕA − θA| = 0, because
the signal sent by Eve would entirely go to one detector
only (A+0 if Eve sent a 0, and A
+
1 if she sent a 1). But
things would go wrong when |ϕA − θA| = pi/4 because
then the signal sent by Eve would be split evenly inside
the corresponding polarimeter (A0 if she sent a 0, or A1 if
she sent a 1), so that no click would occur at all. If Eve
tries to remedy this situation by increasing the signal,
it would only result in both detectors in a polarimeter
clicking at the same time (and then it would incidentally
also lead to double-clicks when |ϕA − θA| = 0). So, the
faked-state attack would fail in a fair sampling test setup
because it would either lead to double-clicks or to no click
at all when |ϕA − θA| = pi/4.
In the time-shift attack [35], when |ϕA − θA| = pi/4 a
photon exiting the PBS in a given channel i, would be
dispatched randomly and with equal probability to ei-
ther detector A+i or detector A
−
i . It would thus become
difficult, if not impossible, for Eve to adjust the time-
shift associated to a specific polarimeter i. She would
not have to deal with just one time-dependent detection
pattern in each output channel i, but with two random
ones, depending on whether a photon ends up in A+i or
in A−i . Note that this is reminiscent of the idea of ran-
domly switching the bit assignments of the two detectors
used in a standard protocol to eliminate the possibility
of exploiting the detection efficiency mismatch [36].
11
CONCLUSION
Contrary to all existing attacks on QKD protocols, the
multiple-photon absorption attack does not require Eve
to be physically located between Alice and Bob and to
intercept anything that was intended for either of them,
as in a typical intercept-and-resend attack [30–32]. The
only requirement is that Eve has managed at some point
in the past to replace the source of entangled state by her
own mixture of separable states. She just needs to know
the state λ of each pulse and that is something that Eve
could have set deterministically in the source. Once this
is done, the security of the QKD protocol is compromised
by anyone who happens to know the polarization of the
pulses as a function of time λ(t).
By mimicking the statistics of an entangled state well
enough to pass the security checks normally undertaken
by Alice and Bob, the attack can in principle work
against any entanglement-based quantum key distribu-
tion protocol. The attack works in particular for both
Ekert and BMM92 protocols, independently of which
protocol is chosen by Alice and Bob.
While there already exist explicit attacks on the
BBM92 protocol [31, 32, 37], to our knowledge the
multiple-photon absorption attack is in fact the only ex-
plicit attack against Ekert protocol with light sources.
As long as a device-independent quantum key distri-
bution [19, 20] is beyond technological reach [35, 36], it is
therefore fundamental for Alice and Bob to either prevent
altogether the possibility of multiple-photon absorptions
in their detectors, or to include a fair sampling test in
the protocol to be able to detect such an attack. The
fair sampling test can be performed unilaterally on ei-
ther side without introducing any loss, and it should also
make the task more complicated if not impossible for
other existing attacks on QKD protocols.
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